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1 
Lecture 
Socratic Method and the Irreducible Core 
of Legal Education 
Donald G. Marshall 
Thanks to all of you for coming today. And a special thanks 
to the many studentspresent and formerthat are here. This 
lecture is for them. 
Since we are gathered to celebrate the creation of the first 
endowed position for teaching at the University of Minnesota 
Law School, I thought it appropriate if I talked about teaching, 
and in particular, teaching law. I do that with trepidation be-
cause I fear that in some respects I will be attempting to de-
scribe the indescribable. Although this is my twenty-eighth 
year of teaching, and I have loved teaching from the moment I 
entered my first class, I have always regarded the dynamics of 
the classroom as a fascinating mystery. With teaching, you can 
intuit that you have had a successful class, and often not know 
exactly what you and the students did or how you and the stu-
dents did it.1 But I will try. 
I will give my views of the why, the what, and the how of 
teaching law. I stress with respect to the how that I will be de-
scribing how I think law should be taught; not how I teach it. 
My description is an aspiration I strive to achieve but some-
times do not. Ive titled my talk Socratic Method and the Irre-
ducible Core of Legal Education. By irreducible core I mean 
 
  Emeritus Professor and Law Alumni Distinguished Teacher, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1953, Williams College; J.D. 1960, Yale 
University. This article is a transcript of a lecture I delivered on January 19, 
1994, when I was inaugurated as Law Alumni Distinguished Teacher. It has 
been edited just to delete irrelevances and to add a small number of footnotes. 
Because the lecture was prepared in December 1993, the sources cited in these 
footnotes are those I consulted prior to that date. Copyright © 2005 by Donald 
G. Marshall. 
 1. Richard B. Parker, A Review of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Mainte-
nance with Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318, 
326 (1976). 
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the absolutely essential knowledge, thoughtways, values, hab-
its, attitudes, and traditions a student must begin to make her 
own before undertaking a career in the public profession of the 
law. My thesis is that that core can be best taught by a variety 
of different types of dialog adapted to the learning situation of 
the moment, and which I have called in my titlesomewhat 
misleadinglySocratic Method. 
Popular myth has it that Socratic method is pervasive in 
American law schools. But nothing could be further from the 
truth. The fact is that teaching and learning by genuine dialog 
has all but disappeared from the second and third years of law 
school, and is fast disappearing from the first. (By genuine dia-
log I mean a dialog based on respect for the promise of the stu-
dents minds and a determination to help them realize that 
promise by providing intellectual challenge.) Professors are 
substituting other pedagogical forms: Onethe lecture
transmits facts and principles, but not the essentials of legal 
education, which require teacher-student and student-student 
interaction. A secondthe pro-forma dialogis a disguised lec-
ture, structured around a series of questions which the teacher 
asks and then answers himself.2 A thirdthe avuncular dia-
logis one conducted by a kindly professor who, in his desire to 
be loved, avoids making any significant demands upon his stu-
dents. The straightforward lecture is a waste of valuable class-
room time and space, and has been ever since the invention of 
the printing press. The pro-forma dialog is both a waste and a 
deception. The avuncular dialog an insult to the students, who 
are entitled to be challenged. Hence, this call for revival of So-
cratic method. 
But Im ahead of myself. I am already talking about the 
how of law teaching, when I should be talking about the why 
and what, because the why and the what lead ineluctably to the 
how. Furthermore, the why, what, and how follow from the fact 
that this is, and should be, a professional school. 
Why teach law? As far as I am concerned, there is only one 
correct answer: because you want to help students prepare 
themselves for entry into the legal profession. Now, a state-
ment of that sort makes some legal academics nervous. They 
think it is too narrowing. They hear phrases like preparation 
for entry into the legal profession and they immediately think 
 
 2. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW 
STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE 168, 17677 (1977). 
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of vocational training in the most parochial of senses. In the 
sense that the economist, Thorstein Veblen, understood when 
he said law schools belong in universities about as much as 
schools of fencing or dancing.3 Only somebody who has never 
practiced or has practiced in a mechanical, mundane fashion
without seeing the possibilities for personal redemption 
through a life in the lawcould entertain that view. The fact is 
that members of the legal profession engage daily in an en-
deavor which is intellectually based, humanistically moti-
vated,4 and richly varied. 
Intellectually based. Thats what Justice Holmes meant 
when, in an address to the students of Brown University, he 
said, The law is the calling of thinkers . . . a man may live 
greatly in the law as well as elsewhere.5 He should have said 
that a man or woman can live more greatly in the law than 
most elsewheres, but he was right about the law being a calling 
of thinkers. The lawyer must constantly apply the arts of 
thought and rationality6 as she functions within and contrib-
utes to the growth of a variety of legal processes. That requires 
high-order intellectual capacities including, among others, 
powers of appropriate generalization, of distinguishing relevant 
from irrelevant similarities, of discrimination, of particulariza-
tion, and of reasoned, lucid articulation.7 
Humanistically motivated. As I understand it, the legal 
profession is a functional group obliged to master a body of 
scholarly knowledge, to be applied in light of articulated stan-
dards of conduct, for the purpose of providing a public service. 
Note the three elements of that definition, all worded in the 
form of obligation: the obligation of professional competence, 
the obligation of professional responsibility, and the obligation 
of public service. Humanistic motivation is what underlies the 
 
 3. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA: A MEMO-
RANDUM ON THE CONDUCT OF UNIVERSITIES BY BUSINESS MEN 211 (1918). 
 4. For a discussion of humanistic motivation, see generally Francis A. 
Allen, Humanistic Legal Education: The Quiet Crisis, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL 
EDUCATION 9 (Neil Gold ed., 1982). 
 5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Your Business as Thinkers (February 17, 
1886), in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, 
LETTERS, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 31, 31 (Max Lerner ed., 1943). 
 6. Francis A. Allen, Mr. Justice Holmes and The Life of the Mind, 52 
B.U. L. REV. 229, 233 (1972), reprinted in FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, 
AND EDUCATION 2, 6 (1979). 
 7. See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in Legal Analysis: A System-
atic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409 passim (1986). 
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obligation of public service. Lawyers provide public services in 
many ways. I shall mention only twoprovided by every work-
ing lawyer and vital to the existence of the Republic. First, 
every working lawyer fulfills a charge to maximiz[e] the social 
interest in tranquility by providing means for the avoidance or 
peaceful resolution of dispute.8 And that chargethat common 
responsibility of the baris no mean thing. After all, it is, in 
the last analysis, the existence and smooth-functioning of insti-
tutional processes for the avoidance and orderly resolution of 
conflict that permit the release of our peoples creative energies 
and the use of those energies to achieve constructive and so-
cially desirable goals. 
Second, every working lawyer provides public service by 
assuring that all individuals and interests have meaningful ac-
cess to both the prophylactic and remedial processes of the law. 
The importance of that service cannot be overemphasized. Law 
is central to the functioning of American society in a way that 
is true of few other existing or past societies. De Tocqueville 
noted that characteristic of this country 160 years ago in his 
monumental work, Democracy in America.9 Americans go to 
law. One may deplore that propensity, as increasing numbers 
of peoplein and out of public lifedo. But deplore as they 
may, our use of law is not going to diminish. Too many modern 
developments reinforce that aspect of our national character: 
industrialization, urbanization, accelerating mobility, growing 
cultural heterogeneity, the depersonalizing of markets for the 
distribution of goods and services, and the unfortunate deterio-
ration of so many nonlegal institutions which used to be agen-
cies of informal controlall centrifugal forces that drive toward 
a noncommunitarian mindset and lead inevitably to depend-
ence on formal institutions. We as a people have always in-
sisted and will continue to insist on framing urgent social, eco-
nomic, and political questions in legal terms. In so doing, we 
will continue to place great problems of social order in the 
hands of lawyers for definition and in the hands of judges, leg-
islators, and administrators for resolution.10 
 
 8. Phil C. Neal, De Tocqueville and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 50 
MARQ. L. REV. 607, 613 (1967). 
 9. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99 (J.P. Mayer 
ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835) (No other nation in 
the world has organized judicial power in the same way as the Americans.). 
 10. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Principle in American Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 921, 923 (1987) (We place great prob-
lems of social order in the hands of lawyers for their definition, and in the 
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Richly Varied. Lawyers practice in private firms, with the 
government and in for-profit and not-for-profit corporations. 
They act as judges, legislators, and governmental administra-
tors. They become private-sector policymakers. And they are 
influential participants and leaders at every level of commu-
nity. Such roles, and the tasks within them, are diverse and 
complex. One consequence of that diversity and complexity is 
that the image of the lawyer-professional used to guide the con-
tent and method of law school teaching is necessarily general. 
Another is that that image must encompass a broad vision. 
There you have it. Intellectually based. Humanistically 
motivated. Richly varied. To help prepare students for entry 
into such a profession is not narrowing; it is liberating. Indeed, 
the law teacher can find derivative redemption in such a life. 
Thats the why of law teaching. Now for the what. 
I take it as a basic premise that we in the law schools 
ought not to attempt to teach anything that can be as well or 
better taught by law firms, broadly defined. We ought to teach 
only that which we can teach better and which the student ab-
solutely must make her own before entry into the profession. 
That is an inseparable body of knowledge, thoughtways, habits, 
and values which are essential to an understanding of the na-
ture of law, and which I call the irreducible core of legal educa-
tion. All courses at the irreducible core are, or should be, 
courses where teacher and student, by studying together, de-
velop that constellation of cognitive and moral capacities neces-
sary to understand the nature of lawusing law here not in 
the popular and least interesting sense of a body of rules, but in 
the sense of an obligatory system that functions through a 
complex set of decision-making [processes], each of those proc-
esses being in itself law.11 Rules (what lay persons ordinarily 
think of as law) are part of those processes, and materials used 
in those processes, but there are other important materials, 
such as doctrines, principles, concepts, maxims, conventions, 
fictions, and, of course, language. Learning how to become a 
lawyer is very much a matter of learning how to use all of those 
materials in light of a received tradition of use. 
One of those processesthe one I shall concentrate on, for 
illustrative purposesis the common law process, by means of 
 
hands of judges for their ultimate resolution.). 
 11. Graham Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE L.J. 
411, 435 (1968). 
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which judges in our system create and implement law. A vari-
ety of intellectual skills, related cognitive capacities, and pro-
fessional values are necessary to understand, and operate effec-
tively within, that process. I say not only understand but 
operate effectively within, because lawyers participation in 
judge-created law is a vital aspect of that process; the student 
must understand the lawyers role and develop the skills neces-
sary to perform it if she is fully to understand the nature of this 
form of law.12 
To start with, the students have to learn how to read and 
analyze published judicial opinions, for they are the primary 
visible source of data about the nature of judicially created law. 
They have to learn how to reduce an opinion to its constituent 
elements, to analyze each independently and in relation to the 
others, then through an act of synthesis arrive at a tentative 
statement of the proposition or propositions for which the opin-
ion stands, and which will be used more or less as a guide to 
resolution of future disputes. They have to learn how to analyze 
a series of related opinions to ascertain how judges in the later 
cases treat seemingly guiding propositions of earlier cases
and they have to learn how to use this knowledge to determine 
the effective reach and limits of those earlier propositions. 
That involves understanding the concept of stare decisis, 
the use of precedent, and the creative tension between prece-
dent and the effectuation of public policy. In connection with 
precedent, the student must master analogical reasoning and 
the skill of reconciling apparent contradictions.13 
By analyzing opinions, students have to learn what counts, 
in light of a received rhetorical tradition, as persuasive justifi-
cations for judicial answers to particular legal problems. Con-
comitantly, they develop a sense of which arguments of counsel 
are likely to be regarded as convincing, which provocative, and 
which acceptable. The convincing argument usually appears in 
the opinion as a justification for decision; the provocative is 
mentioned and rebutted; the acceptable ignored, but not deni-
grated. 
 
 
 12. For a succinct description of the common law as a process and the 
practicing lawyers essential role in that process, see generally Thomas D. 
Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of Implica-
tions and Possibilities, 54 TENN. L. REV. 345 (1987); Harry W. Jones, Our Un-
common Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1975). 
 13. See Wangerin, supra note 7, at 45964. 
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In addition to developing a feel for what arguments of 
counsel count, the students must learn how to construct, pre-
sent, and defend such arguments themselves. To do that, they 
have to develop, in addition to the intellectual skills Ive al-
ready mentioned, a series of related cognitive capacities. They 
must learn how to listen, hear, understand, evaluate, formu-
late, and articulate; and, to do that, they must hone, to a fine 
edge, the mental attributes of attention and alertness. 
I listed among the essential cognitive capacities the lawyer 
must have articulationthe ability to communicate clearly, 
concisely and, if possible, with grace. That involves knowledge 
of and feel and respect for the English language, a mastery of 
legal language, and the skill of precise expression. The preci-
sion of the law students analyses is disclosed by the precision 
of her expression. She has to learn to state her process of deci-
sion and her ideas in concise, accurate, and lucid language. 
In addition, she must commit herself to dialectical reason-
ing as a valuable means of testing the validity of any proposi-
tionthat is, she must recognize the wisdom and instrumental 
power in the idea expressed by the Poet Richard Eberhart 
when he wrote: 
Each argument begets its counterpart, 
Only in opposites the truth is human, 
Intelligible . . . .14 
Finally, the student must learn, and make her own, a se-
ries of professional attitudes, values, and habits, including: 
skepticism toward any generalization when initially perceived, 
invariant thorough preparation, critical self awareness, the ca-
pacity and temperament for autonomous study, a concern for 
the welfare of others and the community, and, preeminently, a 
determination to do justice. Only then will she begin to under-
stand the nature of the law we call common. 
Theres the what of law teaching. Now, the how. I put it to 
you that what I have called the irreducible core of legal educa-
tion can be most successfully taught by use of the dialog 
method of instruction. All other pedagogical methods, except 
clinical, are one-dimensional or, at most, two. The dialog, prop-
erly conceived and used, is multidimensional.15 Because the ir-
 
 14. RICHARD EBERHART, UNDERCLIFF: POEMS 19461953, at 59 (1953), 
quoted in Howard Nemerov, Contemporary Poets, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 
1954, at 67. 
 15. For these and related thoughts I am indebted to JOSEPH AXELROD, 
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reducible core of legal education is an inseparable constellation 
of thoughtways, professional values, personal values, habits, 
and attitudes, only a multidimensional pedagogical technique 
will do. Only such a technique allows achievement of multiple 
teaching-learning goals at the same time. Dialog, artfully em-
ployed, does that by facilitating communication at different lev-
els of abstraction, at different times during the class hour, and 
often at several levels of abstraction simultaneously. 
I have used the phrase Socratic Method in the title of this 
lecture as a synonym for dialog. Actually, that use is mislead-
ing, because Socratic Methodthe pedagogical technique 
used by Socrates in the public market and other meeting places 
of ancient Athensis today only one form of dialog. Many oth-
ers have evolved from Socratess prototypical technique. Al-
though all forms, skillfully used, are multidimensional, particu-
lar forms are best used when a particular learning goal is 
predominant. The teacher must be ever alert to this fact be-
cause it is her or his job to tailor form to goal. I shall briefly de-
scribe two of those forms; but before doing so, I want to say 
something about characteristics common to all dialogs. 
A dialog, as I use the term, is simply a conversation be-
tween teacher and studentin question and answer form
where the teacher asks the questions, and, in so doing, provides 
some direction. By selecting the questions, she selects the 
agenda of conversation. And by varying the nature of the ques-
tions, she produces discourse at varying levels of generality 
with varying degrees of focus. By adjusting the generality and 
focus of the questions she adjusts the conversation to the learn-
ing goal of the moment, allowing her to move from one goal to 
another or back and forth between goals during a single class 
hour. 
Ideally, the dialog involves two peopleteacher and stu-
dent. Thats what President Garfield meant when he was asked 
for his definition of the ideal university, and responded: Mark 
Hopkins at one end of a log and a student at the other.16 In the 
law school context, conditions are far from ideal. Class size var-
 
THE UNIVERSITY TEACHER AS ARTIST (1973). 
 16. Mark Hopkins was Garfields philosophy professor at Williams Col-
lege. Although some commentators question whether the quote is accurate, 
see, e.g., Houston Peterson, Mark Hopkins: 18021887, in GREAT TEACHERS 75 
(Houston Peterson ed., 1956), generations of Williams graduates believe with 
all their hearts that the story is true and that it captures the essence of a Wil-
liams education. 
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ies from 20 to 110. One of the consequent challenges for the 
teacher is to create the illusion that each student is sitting at 
the other end of the log. In a very real sense each student is, 
because the theory of the group dialog is that although at any 
given moment one student is participating in the conversation 
aloud, every other student is participating silently, ready to 
jump in at midstream to continue it. 
As that description indicates, all group dialogs are multire-
lational. The relationships are of three sorts. One between the 
teacher and each student. A second between each student and 
every other student. And a third between the group and each of 
its members. Learning opportunities derive from all three rela-
tionships. The students not only learn from the teacher, they 
also learn from each other. And, most interestingly, learning 
occurs as a result of the relationship between the group and 
each of its members. The group develops a life of its owna 
spirit of inquiry, an ethic of civility and mutual support, a 
standard of professional behavior. The result of the multirela-
tional nature of the dialog is that products of it are joint crea-
tionsall members of the group and the group itself contribute 
to the learning that occurs. The students tend to believeat 
least, when first exposed to the dialog methodthat they are 
only talking, but what they are doing is creating. They are not 
simply talking any more than a poem on a printed page is sim-
ply a sequence of words.17 
In addition to being multidimensional and multirelational, 
the dialog method entails active student participation in the 
learning process. If I had to pick the single most important vir-
tue of the dialog method, it would be this: dialog is a pedagogy 
based on the premise that active learning almost always pro-
duces understanding of a higher quality than passive learning. 
It is a recognition of the wisdom conveyed by the old saw: Tell 
me, and I will forget. Show me, and I will remember. Involve 
me, and I will understand. Involvementat least, informed 
involvementin the learning process provides great motivation 
to learn and produces a qualitatively different form of knowing. 
Whatever the form of dialog, when the teacher asks a ques-
tion, each student has to utilize the six cognitive capacities 
used by the practicing lawyer daily in the performance of most 
law jobs. She has to listen, hear, understand, evaluate, formu-
late a response, and stand ready to articulate and defend it. 
 
 17. AXELROD, supra note 15, at 8. 
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Moreover, each student has to utilize the same six cognitive ca-
pacities with respect to every comment made by a fellow stu-
dent because she will have to formulate a tentative conclusion 
about the comment in order to follow the teachers response or, 
if called on, to make one herself. In addition, the student hones 
the mental attributes of attention and alertness because it is 
only those attributes that allow the use of the other cognitive 
capacities. 
Among the capacities honed by student participation in the 
dialog is articulation. In her articulation of a response (to 
teacher or fellow student) she demonstrates and develops her 
feel for the English language, the language of the law, and for 
concise, accurate, lucid expression. 
By daily participation in dialogs the student also develops 
confidence in her ability to speak before a group whose mission 
it is to evaluate and challenge her ideas or their presentation. 
And that, after all, is the lawyers essential milieu. As confi-
dence develops, quality of participation increases, and, eventu-
ally, if the process works, the student makes the dialog method 
and dialectical reasoning her own, using it over a professional 
lifetime as a means of self-education and self-examination. 
Those are some of the features and learning potentials 
common to all dialogs. Other features and learning potentials 
are characteristic of particular types of dialoga fact that al-
lows the teacher to match and mix: match dialog to the domi-
nant learning goal and mix dialogs as the dominant goal 
changes during a single class hour. There are about four basic 
dialog types, which by modification and blending can be ad-
justed to produce almost limitless variety. Time does not permit 
description of all four. For illustrative purposes, I will briefly 
describe two used for the first time, as far as we know, in clas-
sical Greece, the two which are the prototypical dialogs from 
which all others derive. 
I start with the Socratic dialog, strictly speakingthat is, 
the dialog as conducted by Socrates in ancient Athens. Socrates 
did not publish. For an understanding of his distinctive peda-
gogy we are therefore dependent on descriptions in the writings 
of others, primarily Plato, Xenephon, and Artistophanes.18 Of 
these three, the one who chronicled Socratess teaching most 
 
 18. See, e.g., Encylopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. Socrates; Richard K. 
Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L. 
REV. 725, 729 n.15 (1989). 
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extensively was Plato, who was Socratess student. Platos writ-
ings include a number of dialogs which purport to be accurate 
recollections of exchanges between Socrates and another. 
As recounted by Plato, the dialogs of Socrates have a fixed 
form, structure, and purposeall related to a distinctive theory 
of knowledge, a theory which may sound strange to modern 
ears. As to form, Socrates asked a series of related questions 
and the student answered them. Each question was responsive 
to the student answer to the preceding question. Most notewor-
thy, for present purposes, was Socratess invariant adherence 
to questions; he rarely made a declarative statement. 
As to structure, the typical Socratic dialog had four 
stages.19 In the first, Socrates asked questions until a student 
answer contained an assertion which Socrates deemed a mis-
conception. In the second, Socrates asked a series of questions 
designed to lead the student step by step toward realization 
that his statement was erroneous and why. The third stage was 
the discovery and acknowledgment by the student that his 
statement was misconceived. In the fourth, Socrates asked a fi-
nal series of questions which helped the student discover the 
relevant valid assertion. 
As to purpose, Socratess dialogs were a form of moral edu-
cation, the purpose being to discover ethical truth and thereby 
induce virtuous behavior.20 (One of Socratess questionable sub-
stantive beliefs was that if men know virtue, they will act vir-
tuously.) Since Socratess goal was moral education, his dialogs 
always dealt with the validity of large propositions.21 
As to his epistemology, Socrates believed a persons soul 
contains all ethical knowledge. Teaching ethical truths is, 
therefore, simply a matter of finding the questions that were 
keys to unlock the soul and allow the student to discover 
knowledge he always possessed.22 
The particular learning potential of the Socratic dialog 
does not depend on Socratess theory of soul-possessed knowl-
edge. One can reject that theory and still recognize the wisdom  
 
 
 
 19. Neumann, supra note 18, at 73031. 
 20. William C. Heffernan, Not Socrates, but Protagoras: The Sophistic Ba-
sis of Legal Education, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 40709 (1980). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 409. 
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underlying his pedagogythe wisdom that knowledge has a 
different quality and a different feel when the teacher-aided 
student discovers it for himself. 
In the law school context, the Socratic dialog, strictly 
speakingthat is, the dialog where the teachers only utter-
ances are in the form of questionsshould be used, but spar-
ingly. Sparingly because such a dialog is time consuming; be-
cause many class hours of nothing but questions from the 
teacher can cause intolerable student frustration; and because 
the series of questions designed to expose the student miscon-
ception can have a destructive effect if not followed by a crea-
tive and powerfully restorative series that helps the student 
discover the valid assertion. Therefore, the Socratic dialog, 
strictly speaking, should be used only when the truth of large 
propositions are at stake. For example, discussions of such 
moral propositions as the nature of justice, or the nature of a 
particular form of justice, or the demands of justice in a proto-
typical situation (for example, do and should we have the duty 
to come to the aid of a stranger in peril) are well suited to the 
Socratic dialog. Unmodified Socratic technique also works well 
when examining the validity of large propositions that are not 
ethical in nature; and the teacher should always be alert to the 
utility of a mini-Socratic dialog when, during the course of an-
other type of dialog, she discovers a student misconception that 
can be identified and cured with a limited series of questions. 
Apart from those three situations, the Socratic dialog should be 
modified for most law school discussions to make it more direc-
tional. That can be accomplished if the teacher intersperses her 
questions with declarative statements that provide students 
with less subtle clues to the existence and nature of the mis-
conception and that expedite the timing and impact of the re-
storative part of the dialog. However, the teacher who modifies 
Socratess technique must be ever alert to the danger of signifi-
cantly diminishing student self-discovery, and to the ultimate 
sin of making the dialogue avuncular. 
A second basic form of dialog is the Protagoreannamed 
after Protagoras, another Athenian, the leading Sophist and 
Socrates rival.23 Unlike Socrates, Protagoras left some writ-
ing. Plato also wrote about Protagoras. In fact, a famous Pla-
tonic dialog, the Protagoras, recounts an exchange between 
 
 23. Neumann, supra note 18, at 729. 
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Protagoras and Socrates.24 In his teaching Protagoras did not, 
like Socrates, emphasize the question to the practical exclusion 
of any other form of statement. Protagoras asked questions, but 
he made more statements in declaratory than interrogatory 
form, and the primary form he used was the argument. Prota-
gorass main goal was to train students in the skills of rhetoric. 
His typical dialog was a debate with a student in which he il-
lustrated the techniques of effective argumentation.25 
The Protagorean dialog is obviously useful to the law 
teacher of today to accomplish a variety of learning goals. Ar-
gument and counter-argument (rhetoric) is a useful tool for the 
law student and the lawyer to test the truth value of almost 
any proposition. With regard to common law study, in particu-
lar, the Protagorean dialog can be used to test the reach and 
limits of doctrine, to verify a tentatively selected proposition as 
the, or a, guiding proposition in a judicial opinion, and to apply 
case-derived guiding propositions to hypothetical situations, to 
name just a few uses. Used in imaginative combination with 
other forms of dialog, Protagorean dialog should be a staple of 
the law school teaching-learning process. 
If a law teacher uses a dialog method of instruction
Socratic, Protagorean, Langdellian,26 in aid of role playing, or a 
blend or modification of any of thosewhatever the form, there 
are some essential personal characteristics that he or she must 
demonstrate. Those characteristics follow from the ultimate 
purpose of the dialogto maximize learning by encouraging 
participation in the process of discovery, including, most sig-
nificantly, discovery of the dialogue as a means of autonomous 
learning. First, the teacher must have genuine respect for 
classroom space and time, for the dialog process, and for all po-
tential participants; and she must make that respect evident by 
her preparation. The neophyte instructor often underestimates 
 
 24. PLATO, PROTAGORAS AND MENO (Betty Radice ed., W.K.C. Guthrie 
trans., Penguin Books 1956). 
 25. Heffernan, supra note 20, at 41415. 
 26. Christopher Columbus Langdell was appointed professor at Harvard 
Law School in 1870 and subsequently became dean. He is generally credited 
with introducing the case method of study in American law schools. Langdell 
described his in-class discussions with students about cases as Socratic, but 
some, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 20, think Langdells dialogs were more like 
those of Protagoras than those of Socrates. Indeed, some regard Protagorean 
and Langdellian dialogs as the same in essential respects. See, e.g., Neumann, 
supra note 18, at 72829. For a discussion of Langdellian dialogs, see Heffer-
nan, supra note 20, at 40102; Neumann, supra note 18, at 73944. 
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preparation time and effort because she thinks that a dialogue, 
like an ordinary conversation, has its own momentum. Conse-
quently, she enters the classroom with a yellow scratch pad, 
containing three or four points she wants to cover and starts off 
with a question to Mr. Jones. Jones gives an answer that she 
(the teacher) didnt anticipate and therefore doesnt fully un-
derstand, or she apprehends its meaning but does not see in 
the time available to respond how Joness comment can be used 
as a step in the collective journey of discovery that is the hall-
mark of a successful class. She moves to another student, re-
peating her initial question verbatim, and prays for a response 
she can immediately understand and use; or, more likely, she 
lapses into a mini-lecture, checks off the first point on her 
scratch pad, and moves on to the second. The students perceive 
that as an effort that failed and may attribute it to lack of pro-
fessionalism. In addition to all other values lost in the aborted 
dialog, the teacher has missed the opportunity to model profes-
sional behavior. 
The instructor could have avoided, or at least minimized, 
that loss with thorough preparation. That involves mastery of 
relevant substantive law, but such mastery is only the begin-
ning. The crucial part of preparationthe most demanding and 
creative partrequires acts of imagination. The teacher has to 
imagine the class hour before it occurs. She has to conduct a 
dialog in her head including a variety of responses to her in-
quiries and a separate branching dialog using each imagined 
student response as an integral step. Some people call that 
scripting, but that term, in this context, is a disservice be-
cause it is seriously misleading. It implies a process that is too 
mechanical and manipulative. The acts of imagination I envi-
sion are analogous to the warm ups of an athlete or the finger 
exercises of a pianist. They are designed to limber the mind of 
the teacher, so that she doesnt suffer brain cramp during the 
class hour. But she must not allow herself or her student to be-
come a slave to her imagined dialogsthe purpose of her warm 
up is to release the creative potential of her intellect so that she 
can make flexible and productive use of student comment. 
A second personal quality or characteristic that the teacher 
conducting any sort of dialog must possess is compassion. By 
compassion I do not mean sappy sentimentality that leads to 
the pro-forma dialog or the avuncular dialog. By compassion I 
mean respect for all potential participants in the process and 
something morean appreciation that although dialog imagi-
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natively used is the most effective pedagogical vehicle for learn-
ing the irreducible core of legal education, it can be, when mis-
used, destructive. Most people have never been required to 
state their views before an audience whose mission it is to 
evaluate and criticize those views or their presentation. That is 
the essential milieu of the lawyer, but not most others. The dia-
log is potentially threatening to the uninitiated, and the 
teacher must always be alert to conducting it so as not to 
wound. She should make it clear by her behavior that she re-
spects the enterprise that is the dialog, and that the dialog is 
part of, and she should never sharpen her intellect, curry favor, 
or seek personal satisfaction at student expense. She must not 
only avoid affirmatively harming students, she must build each 
and every students confidence in his ability to perform. She 
must encourage and foster student willingness to expose them-
selves by risking mistake and, if the risk materializes, coming 
back and trying again. 
In addition to being thoroughly prepared and manifesting 
compassion, the teacher must model the constellation of other 
professional characteristics she wishes the students to make 
their own. This is the primary way that communication at si-
multaneous levels occurs. The teachers participation is like a 
rich literary metaphor. She teaches excellence by doing excel-
lenceby displaying to the best of her ability professional vir-
tues she wishes her students to make their own. 
Lastly, to achieve maximum effectiveness the teacher must 
do what she can to include everyone in the dialog. Each student 
must see himself at the other end of the log. The chances of 
that vision occurring will be maximized if the teacher does a 
number of things. First, she should call on a mix of volunteers 
and nonvolunteers. In the ideal dialog, the students would vol-
unteer eagerly to participate. But neither life nor classroom 
discussion is ideal. In every class, a percentage of the students 
are reluctant to participate. There are undoubtedly many rea-
sons for that, one being fear of appearing foolish. For some, the 
prospect of participation is threatening, for a few, overwhelm-
ing. But participation is essential if the student is to profit from 
the process. 
I noted previously that the theory of the group dialog is 
that although one student is participating aloud at any given 
moment, all others are silently formulating imagined responses 
to teacher or fellow-student comment. The dialog works, or not, 
to the extent that silent participation occurs. That form of par-
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ticipation requires enormous self-discipline. In the course of a 
class hour, it is easy and natural for the student to drift off
thinking of what occurred in his life yesterday, or what will oc-
cur tomorrow, or not thinking at alland in those moments of 
drift he loses the thread of the conversation. The prospect of be-
ing called on for vocal participation reinforces the self-
discipline necessary for silent participation. It provides an in-
centive because the students rapidly learn that if they are 
called on to participate, the quality of their vocal participation 
will depend on the extent and quality of the silent participation 
that preceded it. Insisting on participation by nonvolunteers 
also provides students with maximum incentive to study as-
signed materials, because they also rapidly learnif the 
teacher has carefully selected the materialsthat the quality of 
their vocal participation will be largely a result of the quality of 
their preparation, a lesson that every practicing lawyer is re-
minded of daily. 
A sense of group involvement in the dialog is also more 
likely to occur if the teacher works with more than a few vocal 
participants during a class hour and if the nonvolunteer par-
ticipants are randomly selected. Random selection increases 
the incentive for adequate preparation and silent participation. 
I say the teacher should randomly select the nonvolunteers. Ac-
tually, in a large classsay above fiftyshe should randomly 
select from different physical areas of the class. Selection 
should be in an order that envelopes the class in the conversa-
tionfirst a student to the left, then in the rear; a student to 
the right, then the middle and the frontuntil, being envel-
oped, all are on that log. 
Finally, maximum involvement depends, in part, on maxi-
mum understanding. The teacher can increase the chances of 
understanding by a judicious mix of question and declarative 
statement, by providing clues at appropriate stages (in both in-
terrogatory and declarative form), by assuring that she and 
every vocal student participant can be clearly heard, by wel-
coming questions (of a sort and at times that do not signifi-
cantly disrupt the dialog), and by the enthusiasm she brings to 
the classroom. That last characteristic cannot be overesti-
mated. Enthusiasm is contagious in most areas of life, and cer-
tainly in the classroom. Teacher enthusiasm elicits student en-
thusiasm. And student enthusiasm facilitates learning. 
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Well, there you have it. Those are my ideas on the why, the 
what, and the how of teaching part of the irreducible core of le-
gal education. I have ideas about teaching other parts of the ir-
reducible coreother processes which are law, but thats a 
topic for another day. 
I started this lecture by telling you I feared I would be at-
tempting to describe the indescribable. I feared that because, 
when push comes to shove, teaching is an art format least, 
evocative teaching is; and the quintessential evocative mode, 
properly used, is the dialog.27 One can no more convey the es-
sence of a successful dialog than one can convey the overall im-
pact of a painting. Take an OKeefe or a Hopper, reduce it to its 
constituent elementscolor, line, form, subject matter, me-
dium, applicationand what have you said? Not much about 
its effect on the viewer, because its effect is not reducible to its 
constituent elements. It is in part a resultant of those elements, 
but it is much more. It is a creation that ultimately defies 
analysis. Indeed, analysis may drain it of its life, the way a 
punch line of a good joke loses its punch when explained. 
Maybe thats true of evocative teaching also. Maybe, in the end, 
every serious evocative teacher, through the act of teaching, 
seeks redemption by expressing his own personal vision in his 
own personal way. And maybe it is that combination of animat-
ing vision and distinctive style that is the crucial, ineffable in-
gredient of the teaching-learning process. 
I end where I beganwith thanks. Thanks to about 4,50028 
students with whom I have been privileged to study. They have 
been the reason for my professional life. If a fair number think 
I have truly helped them prepare for a life in the law, thats re-
demption enough for me. 
 
 
 27. For a detailed description of evocative teaching, see AXELROD, supra 
note 15, at 755. 
 28. Now, its about 6,000. 
